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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
THE NEW DEFINITION OF DISABILITY POSTSUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities[.]"'
However, the vague language of the ADA has been a formidable
obstacle for courts attempting to interpret the meaning of the term
"disability. ' 2 The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment., 3 The ADA does not
define the key terms "substantially limits," "major life activity" and
"physical or mental impairment" within the statutory definition of
disability, and as a result, courts have struggled with the definition of
disability.4
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., the circuits were divided over whether to
consider the ameliorative effects of any implemented mitigating
measures in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a
major life activity5 Authority for considering one's unmitigated
condition stems from the position taken by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC is the administrative
agency authorized by Congress to promulgate regulations for
implementing Title I of the ADA.6 The EEOC implemented
regulations explaining Title I and defining "substantially limits," "major
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).

2. See Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct" Should Courts ConsiderMitigatingMeasures? 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
917, 919 (1998).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).

4. Seei.
5. 527 U.S. 471,476 (1999).

6. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 922; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). The Attorney
General issued regulations to implement Title H and the Secretary of Transportation issued
regulations to implement the transportation portions in Title II and III. See 42 U.S.C. §§
12134,12149 (1994); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478.
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life activity" and "physical or mental impairment. ' 7 Additionally, the
EEOC promulgated an appendix to the regulations that contained
interpretive guidelines, including the guideline that a person should be

evaluated in one's unmitigated state.

However, the definition of

disability is located in the general provisions of the ADA.9 Congress did
not authorize the EEOC to interpret any provisions that fall outside
Title I or to provide interpretive guidance further explaining Title I.
The disagreement among the circuits over whether to consider
mitigating measures ended when the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Sutton. The Court held that a determination of disability takes
into account any mitigating measures a person uses to ameliorate the
condition. ' Reaction to this decision prompted criticism from advocates
for the disabled. John Hockenberry, an MSNBC anchor, in a scathing

column, wrote:
[T]he Supreme Court last week further refined an answer to the
academic question, 'What is a disability?' The Court said that if
a disability can be corrected or mitigated, employers can
conclude that an impairment does not amount to a substantial

limitation.
This is something of a revelation. I have a job. I have a family. I
travel all over the world. By this definition the fact that I use a
wheelchair to mitigate my paraplegia suggests that I am not
disabled. Someone should tell the doctors working on a cure for
spinal cord injury they are wasting their time. The Supreme
Court just beat them to it."

7. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h-j) (1999).
8. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-(j) (1994); see also, Walsh, supra note 2, at 926.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
10. See 527 U.S. at 471. On the same day, the Supreme Court also decided two other
cases involving the ADA. The decisions in the other cases were based on the holding in
Sutton. Therefore, Sutton is the only opinion that will be analyzed. In Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc. the Supreme Court held that under Sutton a United Parcel Service
mechanic was not substantially limited in a major life activity because his high blood pressure
was corrected with medication. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). The mechanic was dismissed because his
blood pressure exceeded the Department of Transportation's guidelines. See id. at 522. His
job required him to drive UPS vehicles. See id. at 519. In Albertson's,Inc. v. Kirkingburg, a
truck driver was dismissed because he failed to meet the Department of Transportation's
vision requirements due to monocular vision. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). The Supreme Court held
that under the principle in Sutton an individual with monocular vision is not per se disabled.
See id. at 521.
11. John Hockenberry, Op-ed Column, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,1999, at 19A.
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. However, consideration of mitigating measures is the only
reasonable interpretation of the ADA, and the plain meaning of the
ADA supports this conclusion. Otherwise, every person who has a
condition which is fully controlled with medication would be disabled
under the ADA. Sutton creates an important distinction for employers
because the consideration of mitigating measures significantly limits the
breadth of the ADA.
Sutton answered the question of whether to consider mitigating
measures." However, the case left open important questions about the
deference that courts should afford to the EEOC regulations and
interpretive guidelines and whether employers can require an employee
to mitigate an easily correctable condition or illness. This Comment
provides an interpretation of the decision reached in Sutton and
proposes solutions to the questions that the Court did not answer. Part
II discusses the historical development of rights for the disabled. Part
III outlines the relevant provisions of the ADA and the EEOC
regulations and guidelines interpreting the ADA. Part IV briefly
reviews the conflict among the circuits over the EEOC guidelines. Part
V discusses the decision in Sutton, particularly, the rejection of the
EEOC guidelines and the new definition of "disability." Part VI
analyzes whether the EEOC regulations and interpretive guidelines are
entitled to deference based on case law interpreting the amount of
deference agency regulations and interpretations should receive. Part
VII reviews recent cases, post-Sutton, that have addressed the issue of
whether to follow the EEOC regulations and interpretive guidelines.
Part VII proposes that employers should challenge the EEOC
definitions of "substantially limits" and "major life activity."
Specifically, employers should challenge the EEOC's conclusion that
"working" is a "major life activity." Also, this part proposes that
employees should be required to mitigate their conditions and warns
employers to carefully consider the negative effects of mitigating
measures. Most importantly, this part emphasizes that employers should
continue to follow the EEOC guidelines in order to ensure protection
from liability; however, courts in the future probably will grant greater
leeway to employers' actions given the Supreme Court's opinion in
Sutton.

12. 527 U.S. at 482.
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II. PRE-ADA HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS FOR THE
DISABLED

The Civil Rights Movement for the disabled began long before the
ADA was implemented. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
was the first major attempt by Congress to protect the disabled from
discrimination. 3 Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States... shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 4 The protection of the
disabled under Section 504 applies only to federally funded activities or
programs. Because of this, the National Council on Disability ("NCD")
lobbied for a "comprehensive law requiring equal opportunity for
individuals with disabilities with broad coverage and setting clear,
consistent and enforceable standards prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of handicap." 5 Ultimately, the proposed legislation evolved into
what is now the ADA.16
Congressional authority to enact the ADA emanates from the
Fourteenth Amendment Commerce Clause and Equal Protection
Clause.' Much of the testimony before Congress about the plight of the
disabled highlighted the segregation, isolation and lack of equal
opportunity that disabled persons faced, particularly in trying to gain
employment.18 The ADA applies to all employers with fifteen or more
employees.'9 The protection of disabled under the ADA far exceeds in
scope and applicability the protection that Section 504 provides.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ADA AND EEOC REGULATIONS
AND INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES

13. See William Brent Sheihorse, The Untenable Stricture: Pre-MitigationMeasurement
Serves to Deny Protection Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 177, 180 (1998)(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1982). See also Shellhorse, supra note 13, at 180.
15. U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA:
AN ASSESSMENT OF How THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION ISENFORCING TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 17 (1998).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 19-20.

18. See id.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
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Congress passed the ADA "to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities[.]" ' Under Title I of the ADA, which applies solely to
employment, the general rule is that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment."21 The term disability is defined in the general
provisions of the ADA as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment."'
After passage of the ADA, this vague language quickly became an
obstacle to its enforcement, and, in response, Congress authorized the
EEOC to establish regulations further explaining Title I of the ADA.'
Subsequently, the EEOC promulgated regulations in the Code of
Federal Regulations to further interpret terms not defined in the
ADA.24 The EEOC regulations define "substantially limits" as follows:
[U]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.2
The regulations, further, define "major life activity" as "functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 26 The regulations
define "physical or mental impairment" as:
(1) Any

physiological

disorder,

or condition,

20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).

23. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 922; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
24. See generally29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1994).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1994).
26. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(i) (1994).

cosmetic
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disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2)[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.2
The EEOC extracted the definition of physical or mental
impairment and major life activity directly from its regulations
implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'
All of these definitions are employed in determining whether a
person is disabled under the ADA, and each definition is a critical
element in the disability analysis.
Congress mandated that the EEOC establish regulations
interpreting Title I of the ADA, but in doing so, Congress did not give
the EEOC authority to interpret the general provisions of the ADA,
which include the definition of disability." In addition, the EEOC also
promulgated interpretive guidelines in an appendix to the Code of
Federal Regulations to help interpret the ADA, which Congress did not
mandate.' In the appendix of interpretive guidelines, the EEOC further
explained the term "substantially limits." The guidelines state that
"[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or
prosthetic devices. ,,31

The Court rejected this controversial guideline in Sutton.'
Mitigating measures are the steps a person takes to help remedy one's
condition whether it is, for example, in the form of medicine or
prosthetics. Therefore, under the EEOC interpretive guidelines, a
person with diabetes who functions normally with medication, but who
without medication would die is disabled under the ADA because the
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1994).
28. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630(h)-(i) App. (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
30. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 922. See also Erica Worth Harris, Controlled
Impairments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act" A Search for the Meaning of
"Disability,"73 WASH. L. REv. 575,579 (1999); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
31. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. (1994).
32. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 922; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
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beneficial effects of the medication are hot considered. If the mitigating
effects of the medication are considered in the disability analysis, then
this person is not substantially limited in a major life activity because the
medication allows that person to function normally. Another example is
a person who without glasses is legally blind, but with glasses has normal
vision. If the mitigating effect of the glasses is not considered, then this
person is disabled under the EEOC analysis.
IV. HISTORY OF THE DEBATE OVER CONSIDERING MITIGATING
MEASURES

Prior to Sutton, the circuits were divided over whether mitigating
measures should be considered. Some circuits held that the EEOC
guidelines were entitled to deference unless the guidelines were in
opposition to the plain language of the statute.33 The circuits upholding
the EEOC approach determined that the EEOC approach did not
violate the plain language of the ADA because "the agency's
interpretation simply 'places "substantially limits" in proper relation to
the impairment, that is, it relates "substantially limits" to the untreated
impairment.'"" In contrast, other circuits favored the approach that
mitigating measures should be considered on the basis that EEOC
guidelines are not entitled to any deference because the EEOC analysis
was in direct opposition to the plain language of the ADA.3' The
Supreme Court in Sutton adopted this point of view.
V. THE DECISION: SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
This section discusses the facts and analyzes the elements of Sutton
that compels lower courts to consider mitigating measures. This
Comment does not address the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants
regarded them as disabled except to discuss the issue of whether
working is a major life activity. Rather, this Comment focuses solely on
the argument that the plaintiffs were disabled under section 12102(2)(a)
of the ADA.3
33. See Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist
Argument Rejecting the EEOC'sAnalysis of Controlled Disabilities,67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
123,127 (1998).
34. Id.
35. See id
36. Under § 12101(c) of the ADA persons who are "regarded as disabled" are covered

under the ADA. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478. To establish a claim under this section, one must
show either that "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity
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A. The FactualScenario

In 1992, Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, twin sisters, applied for
the position of commercial pilot with United Airlines.' The sisters
qualified for jobs as pilots, except that their uncorrected vision did not
meet the airline's requirements.3 With "corrective lenses, each... ha[d]
vision that [was] 20/20 or better."39 However, the airline required that
all applicants have uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better.40 The airline
made an error and did not recognize that the sisters' uncorrected vision
did not satisfy the standard. 4 During the interviews, the airline
informed the sisters of the mistake and neither of them obtained a job as
a commercial pilot.42
The sisters brought suit alleging that the airline discriminated against
them in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 43 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari from the Tenth Circuit after the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the District Court of Colorado's dismissal of the sisters'
complaint. 44 According to the District Court, because their vision was
fully corrected, the sisters did not have an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity.45 In addition, the District Court dismissed
the sisters' argument that if they were not disabled in fact, then they
were regarded as disabled. 4 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Tenth Circuit in all respects.47
mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities." IM at 489. The employer must have misperceptions about the
individual's condition. See id.
37. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,475 (1999).
38. See id.
39. Id
40. See id. at 476.
41. See id.
42. See id.

43. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,475 (1999).
44. See id. at 495.
45. See id.

46. See id. In Sutton, the twin sisters argued that the airline "mistakenly believes their
physical impairments substantially limit them in the major life activity of working." I. They
supported this allegation by arguing that the vision requirement was based on "myth and
stereotype" and that they were precluded from an entire class of employment. Id at 490.
The Court concluded that the sisters had not established a claim that the airline regarded the
twin sisters as disabled. See id. First, a vision requirement by itself is insufficient to show that
the airline regarded the sisters as disabled. See id. Employers can "decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment-... -are
preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially
limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job." Id.
47. See id.
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B. The Textualist Approach and Deference to the EEOC Guidelines
In Sutton, the sisters first argued that the EEOC interpretive
guideline is entitled to deference on the grounds that the ADA does not
4
specifically address whether mitigating measures should be considered
Without corrective lenses the sisters are substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing.9 The Court held that the plain language of
the ADA requires the consideration of mitigating measures.O The
Court refused to address the issue of deference to agency guidelines
because the Court did not have to look beyond the text of the ADA.
In this case, the Court found that the plain language of the ADA
does support the consideration of mitigating measures. 2 If a statute is
unambiguous, then the Court should not refer to agency regulations or
legislative history for instruction.' Otherwise, the Court is "essentially
delegat[ing] the duty of interpreting the law to legislative actors."'M
Therefore, by reaching the conclusion that the plain language of the
statute required that mitigating measures be considered, the Court did
not have to address whether EEOC regulations are entitled to
deference.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, made the general
statement that "[n]o agency, however, has been given authority to issue
regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the
ADA, ... , which fall outside Titles IV.

Most notably, no agency has

been delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability."' 55 In
addition, Justice O'Connor specifically cast doubt on whether working is
a major life activity as part of the discussion that the twin sisters were
"regarded as disabled.56 Justice O'Connor found that
[b]ecause the parties accept that the term "major life activities"
includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited
regulations. We note, however, that there may be some
conceptual difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include
48. See id.
at 481.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 475.

52. See id.
53. See Elizabeth A. Chang, Note, Who Should Have it Both Ways?: The Role of
MitigatingMeasures in an ADA Analysis, 64 BROOK. L.REv. 1123,1144(1998).

54. Puma, supranote 33, at 142.
55. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
56. See id. at 492; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1994).
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work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is
excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from
working with others] ...

then that exclusion constitutes an

impairment, when the question you're asking is, whether the
exclusion itself is by reason of handicap."'
Therefore, the deference that the EEOC regulations and guidelines
should receive remains an open question. Possible answers to this
question are offered in parts VII and VIII of this Comment.
The Court based its conclusion that the text of the ADA was
unambiguous after examining three separate provisions of the ADA in
context.5 First, the Court examined the language used in the definition
of disability, defined as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more ... major life activities."59 The Court

held that "[b]ecause the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in the Act
in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly
read as requiring that a person be presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a
disability."' The Court continued by explaining that "[a] disability
exists only where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life
activity, not where it 'might,' 'could' or 'would' be substantially limiting
if mitigating measures were not taken. ,61 Therefore, the Court
concluded that an individual whose condition is completely corrected
with mitigating measures is not presently disabled because that person is
not substantially limited in a major life activity.'
The second argument the Court espoused for considering mitigating
measures was that the determination of "whether a person has a
disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry," and evaluating a
person in his unmitigated state would make a case-by-case analysis
difficult if not impossible.6 The Court rejected the EEOC's guideline
because considering a person in his or her unmitigated state "runs
directly counter to the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA. "'
The Court found that "[t]he agency approach would often require courts
57.
5A
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
See id. at 481.
Id (emphasis added) (quoting § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
Id. at 475.
Id.
See id. at 483.
See id.
Id.
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and employers to speculate about a person's condition and would, in
many cases, force them to make a disability determination based on
general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually
affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition." ' In
other words, the EEOC's hypothetical approach would achieve the
exact opposite result that the text of the ADA requires because a
hypothetical approach is not an individualized iquiry.
The third and final provision of the ADA that the Court examined
was Congress' finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older.""6The Court critically examined
this number and found that if mitigating measures are not considered,
then the number of disabled will greatly exceed 43 million.' The Court
looked beyond the text of the ADA in analyzing this number and
considered the basis for this number.
Specifically, the Court looked at a report prepared by the National
Council on Disability. The report addressed the difficulty in estimating
the number of disabled people in the United States because of the
different definitions of disability.6' Each definition yields varying
numbers of disabled. The report stated that the most common estimate
is around 35 or 36 million.6 This number was determined based on a
functional definition of disability, which considers the mitigating effects
of "'special aids,' such as glasses or hearing aids .... ,70 After reviewing
the findings in the report, the Court concluded that the number of
persons estimated to be disabled under a functional approach was akin
to the number Congress cited within the text of the ADA.7
In contrast, a non-functional approach to determining disability,
referred to as a "health conditions approach," yields an estimate of 160
million people.' The Court accounted for the discrepancy between 36
million and 43 million that the ADA cites on the basis that the report
figure only included non-institutionalized individuals, and the Court
determined that institutionalized individuals would account for the

65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).

67. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 485.
70. Id
71. See id.
72. Id.
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difference.' This argument is further strengthened by evidence that the
number of people with vision impairments are estimated in the range of
100 million, which is far beyond the 43 million cited within the
provisions of the ADA.74 The Court concluded:
Because it is included in the ADA's text, the finding that 43
million individuals are disabled gives content to the ADA's
terms, specifically the term "disability." Had Congress intended
to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among
those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a
much higher number of disabled persons in the findings. That it
did not is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only
those whose
impairments are not mitigated by corrective
75
measures.
Therefore, the plain language of the ADA requires that mitigating
measures be considered. As a result, the court deemed that the twin
sisters are not actually disabled.
VI. IN LIGHT OF SUTTON, SHOULD COURTS DEFERTO THE EEOC
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES?

Since Sutton did not address the issue of deference, the question
remains as to what deference if any courts should give the EEOC
regulations and interpretive guidelines. The Chairman of the ABA's
commission on mental and physical disability law, James Carr, reported
"that the Supreme Court's snub of the EEOC is highly significant and
predicted that 'if lower courts do not want to rely on EEOC rules and
guidance, they would be given a lot of leeway." 6 The EEOC is the
"agency directed by Congress to issue implementing regulations to
render technical assistance explaining the responsibilities of covered
individuals and institutions" under Title 77
The appropriate deference to agency regulations implemented
pursuant to a Congressional grant of authority was outlined in Chevron
v. NaturalResources Defense Council.78 In Chevron, the Supreme Court
73. See icL at 475.
74. See id. at 487.
75. MdL
76. Eric Randall, EEOC Guidances Under Scrutiny, ADA UPDATE, (NYPER, New
York), Aug. 1999, at 31.
77. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,646 (1998)(citations omitted).
78. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Echazabel v. Chevron, USA, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
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found that a two step test was appropriate. The first question that must
be addressed is whether the intent of Congress is clear because "[i]f the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." ' However, if the statute is ambiguous the agency
regulation should be given effect if it is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute."81
Under the ADA, Congress delegated to the EEOC the authority to
promulgate regulations for Title I of the ADA that concern
employment discrimination.'
Therefore, the EEOC regulations
interpreting Title I are entitled to deference if the statutory language is
ambiguous because Congress requested the EEOC to promulgate the
regulations.
However, the definition of disability is defined in the general
provisions of the ADA." Therefore, as Justice O'Connor noted in
Sutton, the EEOC was not given any authority to interpret this portion
of the ADA.' This brings into question not only the interpretive
guidelines, but also the EEOC regulations defining "substantially
limits," "physical and mental impairment" and "major life activity,"
which are at issue in almost every ADA case." The interpretive
guidelines in the appendix carry "less weight than the administrative
regulations because it is an interpretation, and not an implementation,
of the statute."" Arguably, given the Court's rejection of the no
mitigating measures guidelines and the dicta by Justice O'Connor, lower
courts are free to disregard the EEOC regulations and interpretive
guidelines pertaining to the general provisions of the ADA that fall
outside Title I of the ADA.
In Skidmore v. Swift, the Supreme Court discussed the deference
given to agency regulations that were promulgated without
*17, n.18 (9th Cir. May 23, 2000) (noting that Chevron is applicable to the determination of
deference given to EEOC regulations interpreting Title I of ADA).

79. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
80. Id.at 842-843.
81. Id.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
84. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
85. See Randall, supra note 74, at 31.
86. Elizabeth A. Crawford, Comment, The Court's Interpretationof a Disability Under
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Are They Keeping Our Promise to the Disabled?, 35
Hous. L. REv. 1207,1218 (1998).
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congressional authority.'
Congress appointed an Administrator to
monitor industries and seek injunctions for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.' However, the Administrator was not given the power
to determine "whether particular cases fall within or without the Act."'
Even though the Administrator's opinions do not have the force of law,
the Supreme Court found as follows:
[The] opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the Courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.'
Based on Skidmore, courts can look to the EEOC guidelines and
regulations for guidance in their opinions if the courts find the
guidelines and regulations persuasive, but courts are not obligated to
grant any deference to the EEOC guidelines and regulations
interpreting the general provisions of the ADA.

VII. RECENT CIRCUIT DECISIONS POST-SUTTON: ARE THE CIRCUITS
GRANTING THE EEOC REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE

GUIDELINES DEFERENCE?
This section reviews case law since the decision in Sutton to explore
how the circuits are treating EEOC regulations and interpretive
guidelines in light of the Supreme Court's rejection of the no mitigating
measures interpretation and the statement that the EEOC does not
have the authority to interpret provisions outside of Title I. Most
circuits will continually grant the EEOC deference until the Supreme
Court clarifies the vague statement made by Justice O'Connor.

87. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

88. See id. at 137.
89. Id.
90. Id at 140.
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A. Circuits GrantingDeference

9 1 The
Some circuits continue to grant deference to the EEOC.
Second Circuit recently decided that "until a more definite
pronouncement" by the Supreme Court, the EEOC regulations and
interpretations will be given weighty The Third Circuit agreed with the
Second Circuit's finding that the EEOC definition of "substantially
limits" is entitled to deference because the definition has been applied
in prior cases.9

B. CircuitsRefusing to Address the Issue of Deference
Some circuits have refused to address the issue of deference. The
Fifth Circuit in a recent opinion declined to address the issue of whether
the EEOC regulations are entitled to deference. The Fifth Circuit
concluded:
[Sutton] now casts a shadow of doubt over the validity and
authority of the EEOC's regulations. However, because we

conclude, based on the plain text of the ADA, that working is
indeed a major life activity, we need not decide whether the
EEOC's regulations are due any deference, or whether we are
bound by our own precedent to respect them.9
Also, the Ninth Circuit in a recent opinion accepted the EEOC

91. See infra, notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
92. Muller v. Costello, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18651, at *36 (2d Cir. Aug. 11,
1999)(holding that a former New York correctional officer with asthma that prevented the
officer from exposure to tobacco smoke had not proven that he was substantially limited in a
major life activity; however, the court upheld the lower court's finding that the officer was
unlawfully retaliated against by the Department of Corrections because of his asthma); see
also Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Comm. Adolescent
Program, Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30720, at *10 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 1999) (granting
substantial deference to EEOC on the basis of the decision in Muller, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis
18651, at *36).
93. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing the lower
court decision granting summary judgment on the grounds that "a reasonable jury could
conclude that Taylor requested accommodations, that the school district made no effort to
help Taylor find accommodations and was responsible for the breakdown in the process, and
that there were accommodations that the school district could have provided that would have
made Taylor able to perform the essential functions of her job." Id. at 320).
94. EEOC v. R. J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 n.5 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
President of Gallagher Co. with cancer was not substantially limited in a major life activity;
however, a genuine issue of material fact existed over whether the former president was
regarded as disabled. Id. at 655-57.)
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regulations as valid and relied on the EEOC regulations because the
parties accepted the regulations as valid.'
VIII. OPTIONS FOR EMPLOYERS IN LIGHT OF SUTTON

This section outlines options that employers could consider given the
Court's decision in Sutton. Employers could challenge the EEOC
regulations interpreting the general provisions of the ADA, particularly
the definitions of "major life activity" and "substantially limits." In
addition, employers should evaluate and consider the negative effects of
the mitigating measures that an employee uses. Further, employers
could argue that employees must take steps to mitigate conditions that
can be easily corrected.
A. EEOCProvisionsthat Should Be Challenged

The Second and Third Circuits continue to grant deference to the
EEOC regulations and guidelines, while the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have refused to address the issue of whether the EEOC regulations and
guidelines are entitled to deference. Based on the circuits' opinions in
this area, employers should continue to follow the EEOC requirements
under Title I and the definitions of disability in order to ensure
compliance with the ADA.
However, the EEOC regulations interpreting the general provisions
that fall outside of Title I could be challenged on the grounds that the
EEOC does not have the authority to promulgate definitions for
"substantially limits," "physical or mental impairment" and "major life
activity."
1. Challenging the EEOC Position that Work is a Major Life Activity
The major life activity of "working" could be challenged. Inclusion
of working in the definition of major life activity provides a catch all for
plaintiffs that cannot fit within another category such as breathing and
walking. The Court suggests in Sutton that it is circular to argue that
working is a major life aciivity.9 The Court cites the example of a
person who is unable to work with others.' The inability to work would
95. See Broussard v. Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 1252, 1256 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
technician with carpal tunnels syndrome was not substantially limited in the major life activity
of working); see also Mcalindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999)
(applying EEOC regulations because parties did not contest their validity).
96. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999).
97. See id.
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be the impairment and the major life activity. This is circular because
the inability to work should be the result of a "handicap." Given the
Supreme Court's rejection of the EEOC interpretive guidance and the
doubt cast on the validity that working is a major life activity, lower
courts have ample authority for finding that working is not a major life
activity. Most importantly, one court recently held that working was not
a major life activity.8
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama relying on Sutton held in Mullins v. Crowell that working is not
a major life activity under the Rehabilitation Act.'
The court
concluded:
[W]orking is not a life activity in the sense that it is an aspect of
basic human physical or mental functioning. A limitation in
one's ability to work is contingent upon an impairment limiting
some other area of physical or mental functioning. It makes
sense to say that one is limited in his or her ability to work
because he or she is limited in his or her ability to see; it makes
no sense to say the contrary. Thus, a limitation on working is
itself not a limitation on a basic aspect of human functioning.
Rather it is a consequence-... -of a limitation on an area of
basic human functioning.' °°
The court held that working as a major life activity "paves over"
establishing the causation link between the impairment and the inability
to work."' The impairment is what limits the ability of the individual to
work. The analysis in this case is persuasive. It would be a significant
advantage for employers if working was eliminated as a major life
activity because "'working' seems to be the 'major life activity' most
often cited in claims brought under the act.""'
2. Challenging the Definition of "Substantially Limits"
Employers should also challenge the definition of "substantially
limits." In Sutton, the Court first looked to the dictionary and second to
the EEOC definition of "substantially limits" to define "substantially"
98. See Mullins v. Crowell, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
99. See id.
100. Id.at 1141.
101. See id,
102. Sydney R Steinberg, Supreme Court Defines 'Disability' Under Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, EMP. LrrIG. REP., Jul. 27,1999, at 4.
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in evaluating whether the twin sisters were "regarded as disabled. ' 01
The dictionary defines "substantial" as "considerable" or "to a large
degree. ' '° This supports the inference that the Court does not believe
that the EEOC regulations interpreting the general provisions of the
ADA are entitled to much, if any deference. If the Court believed that
the regulations were entitled to deference, the Court would have relied
solely on the EEOC definition. The emphasis of the Court is on the
plain meaning of the ADA. Weakening this conclusion is the Supreme
Court's ruling in an earlier decision, Bragdon v. Abbot,"° where the
court "relied on EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance in
determining what is a disability."'°6 However, the Court in Bragdon did
not employ the EEOC definitions of those provisions falling outside of
Title I"° and the Court in Sutton did not question the EEOC authority to
issue regulations to implement Title I" Therefore, a viable argument
can be espoused challenging the EEOC definition of "substantially
limits."
B. The Caveatfor Employers: The Importance of the Requirementthat
the Negative Effects of MitigatingMeasures Be Considered
Under the Court's analysis in Sutton employers must carefully
consider the negative effects of any mitigating measures an employee
uses. The Eighth Circuit, in Belk v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,1 O'
extensively interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling in Sutton that
mitigating measures must be considered including the negative effects of
mitigating measures. The plaintiff wore a full-length leg brace as a
result of polio. In order to qualify for the job of Customer Service
Technician, the plaintiff had to pass arm lift, arm strength endurance,
sit-ups and leg lift tests."' The plaintiff asked for an accommodation for

103. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. There was no need to define substantially limits under
the first portion of the opinion addressing whether the twins were actually disabled because
this part of the decision turned on whether the mitigating effects of the glasses was
considered.
104. See id. at 491 (quoting Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary 2280 (1976)); see also
Steinberg, supra note 99, at 4.
105. 524 U.S. 624,645-47 (1998).
106. Panel Discusses Impact of Supreme Court Decisions, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE
BULL., (LRP Publications, Horsham, Pa.), Aug. 30, 1999, Vol. 15, No. 7.
107. See Bragdon,524 U.S. at 647.

10& See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478-79.
109. 194 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1999).
110. See id. at 948.
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the leg lift test, which the defendant refused."' The plaintiff did not pass
the leg lift test and was not hired as a result. In determining whether
the plaintiff was disabled under the ADA, the Eighth Circuit noted that
"the Sutton Court stated that the mere use of a corrective device alone
is not enough to relieve an individual of a disability; rather, 'one has a
disability under subsection A if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective
113
device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.'
Based on this premise, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking because the
plaintiff's range of motion was limited and the plaintiff walked with a
significant limp. 14 The court concluded that "[t]hese considerations
abide by the language in Sutton which directs courts to contemplate the
measures, as well as the positive, in
negative side effects of1 mitigating
5
determining disability."
This opinion is noteworthy because it supports the view that
although mitigating measures are going to be considered, courts will
seriously consider the negative effects of the corrective device on the
person. Therefore, if a person has an illness or physical impairment that
is easily correctable with medication or a corrective device, like a
prosthesis, then the negative side effects in the workplace and to the
individual ought also be considered. Most medications have side effects.
For example, many medications list side effects like headaches,
drowsiness, nausea, dehydration and dizziness. Potentially, there will be
situations where the side effects of medication substantially limit a
major life activity. Therefore, employers must carefully evaluate an
employee to ensure that although the employee is not presently disabled
by the underlying illness or condition, the employee is not disabled as a
result of the negative effects of the mitigating measures.
C. Should Employees Be Required to Take Steps to Mitigate Their
Condition?
The decision in Sutton also left open the issue of whether employees
should be required to take steps to mitigate their condition, particularly
for conditions that are easily corrected by medication or corrective
111. See id. at 948-49.

112. See id. at 949.
113. Id. at 950 (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488); see also Popko v. Pa. State Univ., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 589,594 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
114. See Belk, 194 F.3d at 950.
115. Id
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devices, such as eyeglasses or medication to control mental illness or
chronic illnesses like diabetes. The Sutton decision might discourage
some people from taking steps to improve their condition. The
observation has been made that "[i]t does not seem to be a great stretch
to bar from ADA coverage employees whose 'disabilities' could be
easily corrected, but who do not do so. '11 6

Employees should be

required to take steps to mitigate easily correctable conditions in order
to give effect to the Sutton decision. If courts must consider the
mitigating effects of a corrective device, then the courts should consider
the mitigating measures that an employee could use for an easily
correctable condition. This is necessary to protect employees that are
truly disabled.
IX. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.

represents some relief for employers. The court correctly concluded
that the plain language of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires
that mitigating measures must be considered when determining whether
an individual is disabled. However, the Court failed to address the
amount of deference EEOC regulations and guidelines should receive.
In light of Sutton, employers should continue to challenge the EEOC
regulations and interpretive guidelines interpreting the general
provisions of the ADA. Employers should assert that employees must
first take steps to mitigate their conditions in order to be protected
under the ADA.
In addition, employers should challenge the EEOC's approach that
working is a major life activity. Working should not be considered a
major life activity because individuals should be evaluated to determine
whether they are disabled, and as a result, the disability prevents them
from working, not the inability to work. In addition, employees could
be required to employ mitigating measures to correct easily correctable
problems because employers should not be liable under the ADA when
the employee makes the decision not to correct his or her condition.
Finally, employers should consider the negative effects of the mitigating
measures a person employs in ensuring compliance with the ADA.
More lawsuits likely will arise under the auspices that the negative
effects of the mitigating measures render the individual disabled. All of
these questions remain for the courts to decide. Most importantly, until

116. Steinberg, supra note 99, at 5.
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a more certain pronouncement by the courts, employers should continue
to rely on EEOC regulations and guidelines interpreting the ADA to
minimize litigation.
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